

























	 Will	there	be	a	Longevity	Dividend?			 Return	to	the	super-aging	society	(SAS)	problem	that	I	outlined	in	the	introduction.	We	are	now	able	to	get	a	clearer	sense	of	the	causes	of	this	problem.	In	essence,	the	SAS	problem	results	from	a	combination	of	LE1	and	low	fertility	rates.	It	is	the	fact	that	we	are	getting	better	at	extending	the	relatively	unhealthy	and	dependent	phase	of	live,	coupled	with	the	fact	that	there	are	fewer	young	people	to	pay	for	the	care	of	the	aging	population,	that	causes	the	problem.	This	combination	often	scares	policy-makers	and	politicians.	It	suggests	to	them	that	it’s	a	bad	thing	to	further	prioritize	lifespan	extension.	It	suggests	that	the	SAS	problem	is	one	of	the	considerations	that	might	count	against	or	override	the	value	presumption	in	favor	of	lifespan	extension.	A	possible	solution	would	be	to	increase	fertility	by	some	compensating	measure.	But	this	too	is	a	concern	for	policy-makers	because	lower	fertility	correlates	fairly	consistently	with	higher	living	standards,	and	there	are	additional	concerns	about	the	resource	drain	created	by	larger	global	populations.			 This	is	where	proponents	of	LE2	step	in.	They	argue	that	policy-makers	have	been	focused	on	the	wrong	type	of	lifespan	extension.	It	is	true	that	LE1	contributes	the	SAS	problem,	but	LE1	is	not	the	only	game	in	town.	There	is	also	LE2.	If	we	prioritized	investments	into	LE2	over	investments	into	LE1	we	could	address	the	SAS	problem	without	going	down	the	route	of	increasing	fertility.	This	is	the	so-called	‘longevity	dividend’	argument.	Olshansky	et	al	(2007,	12)	put	it	as	follows:			 “[A]ging	interventions	have	the	potential	to	do	what	no	surgical	procedure,	behavior	modification,	or	cure	for	any	one	major	fatal	disease	can	do;	namely,	






	 The	Postwork	Utopia	as	a	World	of	Games			 My	doubts	about	flourishing	in	a	postwork	future	rest	on	the	possible	‘meaning	deficit’	that	could	arise	in	such	a	world.	Meaning	is	a	distinct	component	of	well-being.	It	is	a	contested	philosophical	concept,	but	for	present	purposes	I	will	focus	one	plausible	theory,	taken	from	the	work	of	Thaddeus	Metz	(2010).	This	theory	argues	that	our	lives	accumulate	meaning	when	we	contour	our	intellects	to	the	pursuit	of	the	good,	the	true	and	the	beautiful.	In	other	words,	when	we	act	to	bring	about	morally	good	states	of	affairs,	pursue	and	attain	a	true	conception	of	reality,	and	produce	(and	admire)	things	of	great	aesthetic	beauty.	It	is	critical	to	this	theory	that	your	individual	actions	help	to	achieve	these	three	great	states	of	affairs.	In	other	words,	there	must	be	a	link	(typically	causal	and/or	mental)	between	what	you	do	and	what	happens	in	the	world	around	you.	The	problem	is	that	the	automating	technologies	that	make	TU	an	impending	reality	also	threaten	to	sever	that	causal-mental	link	between	what	you	do	and	what	happens	in	the	world	around	you.	Automating	technologies,	after	all,	obviate	the	need	for	humans	in	certain	endeavors.				 The	problem	then	with	those,	like	me,	who	insist	that	paid	work	is	often	boring	and	degrading,	and	that	we	would	be	better	off	without	it,	is	that	we	tend	to	assume	that	if	we	can	achieve	TU	and	BIG,	then	the	automating	technologies	that	make	this	possible	will	simply	free	us	up	to	pursue	things	that	provide	opportunities	for	genuine	meaning	and	flourishing.	But	it	may	not	work	that	way.	There	is	no	good	reason	to	think	that	advances	in	automating	technologies	limit	themselves	to	activities	that	provide	less	meaning	for	humans.	In	fact	we	already	know	that	technological	developments	affect	other	domains	where	we	would	like	humans	to	remain	relevant.	For	example,	if	we	assume	that	science	is	the	main	way	in	which	we	pursue	‘the	true’	in	the	modern	world,	then	there	are	already	some	obvious	ways	in	which	automating	technologies	are	removing	us	from	this	domain	of	meaning.	Science	is	increasingly	a	big	data	enterprise,	in	which	machine	learning	algorithms	are	leveraged	to	make	sense	of	large	datasets,	and	to	make	new	and	interesting	discoveries.	These	systems	are	in	their	infancy	now,	but	already	we	see	ways	in	which	the	algorithms	are	attenuating	the	link	between	individual	scientists	and	new	discoveries.	Why?	Because	they	are	becoming	increasingly	complex,	and	working	in	ways	that	are	beyond	the	understanding	and	control	of	the	individual	scientists.	The	crucial	causal-mental	link	is	being	cut.	







		 At	first	glance,	it	would	seem	like	games	don’t	fit	neatly	within	this	Aristotelian	framework.	Games	are	certainly	goal-directed	activities	(the	prelusory	goal	is	essential	to	their	structure).	And	so	this	makes	them	look	like	kineseis.	But	remember	the	goals	are	essentially	inconsequential.	They	have	no	deeper	meaning	or	significance.	As	a	result,	the	game	is	really	all	about	process.	It	is	about	finding	ways	to	overcome	the	artificial	obstacles	established	by	the	constitutive	rules.	Games	are	consequently	excellent	platform	for	realizing	the	Aristotelian	ideal.	They	are	activities	directed	at	some	external	end,	but	the	end	itself	has	no	value;	the	internal	process	is	the	sole	source	of	value.	Indeed,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	games	are	an	even	better	way	of	achieving	Aristotle’s	ideal	than	Aristotle’s	own	suggestion.	The	problem	with	Aristotle’s	suggestion	is	that	intellectual	activity	often	does	have	valuable	goals	lurking	in	the	background	(e.g.	attaining	some	true	insight).	There	is	always	the	risk	that	these	goals	trump	the	inherent	value	of	the	intellectual	process.	With	games,	you	never	have	that	risk.	The	goals	are	valueless	from	the	get-go.	Purely	procedural	goods	can	really	flourish	in	the	world	of	games.			 This	makes	a	postwork	world,	consisting	of	nothing	but	elaborately	constructed	games	look	like	a	world	that	allows	for	a	certain	kind	of	flourishing.	But	is	this	flourishing	enough?	Ironically,	Hurka	has	his	doubts.	While	he	accepts	that	the	game-playing	life	allows	for	some	flourishing,	he	still	thinks	it	is	of	a	weaker	or	inferior	sort	because	the	players	are	cut	off	from	true	sources	of	meaning	like	the	good	and	the	true.	This	suggests	a	retreat	to	the	vision	of	meaning	I	outlined	earlier.			 But	I	want	to	suggest	that	Hurka.	There	may	be	nothing	inferior	about	a	world	in	which	humans	are	no	longer	concerned	with	things	like	the	good	and	the	true.	Indeed,	this	world	of	elaborate	but	ultimately	inconsequential	games	is	arguably	the	most	plausible	conception	of	what	a	utopian	world	would	look	like.	If	you	think	about	it,	the	other	proposed	sources	of	meaning	(e.g.	the	good	and	the	true)	only	really	make	sense	in	an	imperfect	world.	It	is	because	people	suffer	or	lack	basic	goods	and	services	that	we	need	to	engage	in	moral	projects	that	improve	their	well-being	and	resolve	distributional	injustices.	Similarly,	it	is	only	because	we	are	epistemically	impaired	that	we	need	to	pursue	the	truth.	If	we	lived	in	a	world	in	which	those	impairments	had	been	overcome,	the	meaning	derived	from	those	activities	would	no	longer	make	sense.	The	external	goods	would	be	readily	available	to	all	and	would	no	longer	be	a	source	of	concern	or	longing.	In	such	a	world,	we	would	expect	the	purely	procedural	goods	alluded	to	by	Hurka	to	be	the	only	game	in	town.	And	what	is	a	world	devoid	of	suffering,	impairment	and	limitation?	Surely	it	is	a	utopia?	By	enabling	us	to	see	the	value	of	game-playing	as	a	source	of	flourishing,	this	might	be	exactly	what	the	combination	of	TU	and	LE2	helps	us	to	bring	about.			
	 Conclusion	
	 		 Where	does	this	analysis	leave	us?	A	brief	summary	is	in	order.	First,	the	SAS	problem	is	definitely	a	problem:	one	that	societies	need	to	confront.	
Furthermore,	they	will	not	be	able	to	confront	it	simply	by	prioritizing	LE2	over	LE1,	as	proponents	of	the	longevity	dividend	argument	would	have	us	believe.	This	is	because	that	argument	neglects	to	consider	the	potential	impact	of	TU	on	its	motivating	premise.	But	this	does	not	mean	that	LE2	is	unworthy	of	our	support.	It	deserves	our	support	if	we	grant	that	there	is	value	(in	most	circumstances)	to	avoiding	death	and	living	in	states	of	flourishing	and	well-being.	Nevertheless,	defenders	of	LE2	still	need	to	think	about	how	the	distributional	crises	exacerbated	by	SAS	and	TU	will	be	resolved	and,	perhaps	most	importantly,	about	what	meaning	and	flourishing	look	like	in	a	world	of	rampant	automation.	I	have	suggested	that	we	may	need	to	embrace	a	radical	vision	in	which	TU	and	LE2	make	possible	a	utopian,	game-playing	mode	of	existence.			
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																																																								i	In	my	home	university,	NUI	Galway,	there	is	currently	a	large	EU	pilot	project	taking	place	on	the	use	of	robots	for	the	care	of	aging	patients	with	dementia.	See	The	MARIO	Project	-	http://www.mario-project.eu/portal/		ii	I	say	‘pragmatic	concerns’	because	the	argument	for	BIG	is	not	a	solely	pragmatic	one.	There	are	several	arguments	in	favour	of	BIG	that	derive	from	philosophical	accounts	of	political	freedom.	See,	for	example,	Widerquist	2013.	iii	I	was	first	encouraged	to	consider	this	possibility	during	an	interview	conducted	by	Jon	Perry	and	Ted	Kupper	on	the	Review	the	Future	Podcast.	I	would	like	to	thank	them	both	for	suggesting	this	line	of	inquiry.	The	podcast	itself	can	be	heard	at:	http://reviewthefuture.com/?p=606		
